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In August 2020, we wrote on the massive job loss in the
United States over the early stages of the COVID-19
pandemic and the racial/ethnic and gender disparities in job recovery.1 From February to June 2020 the
United States had experienced a net loss of more than
15 million workers, but the declines were greater
among women than men (11.2 percent compared to
7.9 percent), and greater for Blacks (11.5 percent) and
Latinos (12.3 percent) than for Whites (7.5 percent).
A lot has happened since then. The latest unemployment picture (see Figure 4 below) still shows that Blacks
have an unemployment rate nearly two times higher
and Latinos 1.5 times higher than Whites. The relative
unemployment rankings of these groups mimic those of
the pre-COVID period, but jobless rates for all groups
remain higher than they were prior to the pandemic.
This policy brief provides an update on the employment trends that took place between February 2020
and June 2021. Our analysis focuses on the change in
the number of persons with a job as well as on the great
changes that have occurred in the size of the civilian
labor force and the levels of unemployment. We further
contrast the employment patterns of U.S. workers
through comparisons across gender, racial/ethnic, and
educational lines, and, for Latinos, nativity status. The
analysis subsequently highlights disparities in the ability to work from home during the pandemic and variations in the fortunes and woes of the U.S. workforce.
Our analysis shows much change in certain
respects and some continuities concerning employment patterns. Some groups of individuals have
surpassed the employment levels they had before
the plunge of the economy in the spring of 2020,
other groups are getting close to that level, and other

Huddleston Hall • 73 Main Street • Durham, NH 03824
(603) 862-2821 • carsey.unh.edu

groups are further below their job levels of that time.
However, one thing is certain: the attainment of or
close proximity to regaining the employment level
of February 2020 does not necessarily translate to
low unemployment rates in June 2021. Such seeming
contradictions reflect the changes that have occurred
in the civilian population 16 and older over the 16
months to June 2021. There has been much movement in and out of the civilian labor force since the
pandemic. Many persons have had to leave the labor
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force to take care of children or
address other familial responsibilities, some have lost their jobs,
some have found jobs, and still
others have opted for retirement.
Sadly, many others who were
part of the civilian labor force in
February 2020 are no longer with
us—more than 653,000 persons in
the United States have died due to
COVID-19 as of this writing.

The Big Picture
There have been significant
improvements in the number of
individuals holding a job since
the job plunge in April 2020,
when there were 25 million fewer
workers than two months earlier.
Nonetheless, employment has not
recovered, as there were still 5.9
million fewer people with a job in
June 2021 than in February 2020
(Figure 1), a drop of 3.7 percent.
The full employment panorama,
however, shows that the number of
people who are unemployed soared
59 percent between February 2020
and June 2021, and participation
in the civilian labor force plunged
by 2.1 million persons, a drop of
1.3 percent, during this period. In
fact, as these individuals dropped
out of the labor force, they contributed to the expansion of 3.8 million
persons 16 and older who were not
part of the labor force over those 16
months. The growth of persons not
in the civilian labor force was disproportionately among those who
retired: 92 percent of the 3.8 million
who left the labor force retired.
All told, the nation’s unemployment rate stood at 6.2 percent in
June 2021 compared to 3.9 percent
in February 2020. Underlying this
top-line number is much variation in
job loss and changes in the civilian
labor force along race/ethnic, gender,
and, for Latinos, nativity lines.

Box 1: Defining Unemployment
To understand how the pandemic has affected joblessness in the United States, it is
important to understand the technical definition of unemployment. Calculations
begin with the civilian working-age population, i.e., those 16 years of age and
older, which as of June 2020 was 265.5 million. (Note that in our analysis, we focus
on the civilian labor force, thus excluding workers who are part of the military.)
The civilian working-age population falls into two distinct groups: those participating in the labor force (162.7 million as of June 2020) and those not participating (102.8 million). The labor force participation rate is computed by dividing
the number of working-age people participating in the civilian labor force by the
total working-age population. In June 2020 that share was 61.3 percent (162.7 million divided by 265.5 million).
The unemployed are part of the Segmentation of Working-Age Population Into Key
Labor Market Components Referred to in Text
labor force; though they are not
currently working, they are actively
pursuing work. The unemployment rate is calculated by dividing
the number of people who are
currently not working but actively
looking for work (10.1 million in
June 2020) by the total population
in the civilian labor force (162.7
million). This share—the unemployment rate—was 6.2 percent in
June 2020. The complement to the
unemployment rate is the employment rate, which is obtained by
dividing the number of people who are currently working (152.6 million) by the
total population in the civilian labor force. This share was 93.8 percent in June 2020.
FIGURE 1. TOTAL NUMBER OF EMPLOYED PERSONS, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
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Many Fewer Women With a
Job and in the Labor Force
Job recovery varies tremendously
along gender lines. There were 5.1
percent fewer employed women in
June 2021 than in February 2020
and 2.4 percent fewer employed
men, meaning that women were
more than twice as likely as men to
have had a job in February 2020 but
to lack one (whether through unemployment or by leaving the labor
force) in June 2021 (Figure 2).
Not only were there inordinately
fewer women with a job, but they
were much more likely than men to
leave the civilian labor force—that
is, they currently do not have a job
and they are not actively seeking one.
Indeed, 61 percent of women who no
longer have a job were no longer part
of the labor force in June 2021 compared to 19 percent of men. Thus,
there were 4.5 women who were no
longer in the labor force in June 2021
for each one man who had made the
exit. This disparity clearly illustrates
the gendered impact of the pandemic
on work activity.
Other barometers point to the
disadvantaged position of women in
the workforce compared to men. For
example, between February 2020 and
June 2021, the number of unemployed
soared by 78 percent for women
compared to 45 percent for men, the
number of persons not in the labor
force rose by 1.4 percent for women
and declined by 0.6 percent for men,
and the number of retired persons
increased by 7.8 percent for women
compared to 6.7 percent for men.
The greater decline of women in
the civilian labor force needs to be
taken into account in making sense
of unemployment rates of women
and men. In June 2021, women (6.3
percent unemployment) and men
(6.2 percent) essentially had the same
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FIGURE 2. PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYED PERSONS BY GENDER,
FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.

level of unemployment. In this regard,
the unemployment rate of women
looks comparable to that of men, but
it hides the large number of women
who have exited the labor force and
are no longer counted in the computation of the unemployment rate.

A Paradox: Fewer Whites
With Jobs, But Higher
Unemployment Among
Blacks and Latinos
In our brief on this subject last year,
we described how workers of color
were particularly hard hit during the
early phases of the pandemic. Now,
the number of persons holding a
job have significantly shifted across
racial/ethnic lines. There were 4
percent fewer White workers in June
2021 than in February 2020 compared to lower declines among Blacks
(-2.6 percent) and Latinos (-3.6 percent) (Figure 3). Whites accounted
for two-thirds of the decline of 5.9
million workers over the 16 months
to June 2021, Latinos for 17 percent,

Blacks for 8 percent, and all other
racial groups for 8 percent.
Despite the more favorable
employment trends of Blacks and
Latinos compared to Whites, the
lower unemployment rates of Whites
found earlier persist in June 2021.
The unemployment rate for Blacks
was 9.7 percent, 1.9 times higher
than the rate for Whites (5 percent);
for Latinos the 7.5 percent unemployment rate was 1.5 times higher
than that for Whites (Figure 4).
What accounts for this paradox, a
more favorable job situation among
Blacks and Latinos but more unfavorable levels of unemployment
compared to Whites? The primary
explanation is that there has been a
greater tendency for Whites to leave
the labor force than for Latinos and
Blacks. The number of Whites in
the civilian labor force dropped by
2.1 percent between February 2020
and June 2021 compared to a dip of
0.9 percent among Latinos; Blacks
actually experienced a growth of 1
percent in the labor force. The labor
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FIGURE 3. PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYED PERSONS BY RACE/ETHNICITY,
FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.

FIGURE 4. PERCENT OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE UNEMPLOYED BY RACE/
ETHNICITY, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.

force exit of Whites is dominated
by the growth of 2.2 million in the
White retiree population, which
rose by 6 percent between February
2020 and June 2021—a growth rate
2.6 times higher than that experienced in similar length periods
before the pandemic (e.g., the retiree

population grew 2.3 percent between
February 2018 and June 2019). Still,
despite the absolute numbers being
much smaller, the retiree populations of Latinos (13.9 percent) and
Blacks (9.7 percent) grew at a swifter
pace than that of Whites over the 16
months to June 2021.

Rising Employment for
Men of Color, Worse for
Women Across the Board
The more favorable employment
situation of Latinos and Blacks,
however, occurred only for men.
Between February 2020 and June
2021, the number of Black men with
a job inched upward by 1 percent,
while that of Latino men dropped
by 1.8 percent, less than the decline
of 3.1 percent of Whites (Figure 5).
In contrast, women have fared much
worse across racial/ethnic groups: 5.9
percent fewer Latina women had a
job in June 2021 than 16 months earlier, 5.7 percent fewer Black women,
and 5 percent fewer White women.
The brighter job position of Black
and Latino men is due, in part, to
their rising labor market activity.
Between February 2020 and June
2021, 4.1 percent more Black men
and 0.3 percent more Latino men
were in the civilian labor force. The
other four subgroups experienced
declines in their labor force tallies:
-2.6 percent for White women, -2.3
percent for Latina women, -1.7
percent for Black women, and -1.6
percent for White men.
The significant growth of persons
who have retired occurred across all
groups during the pandemic. Among
White women 1.2 million retired over
the 16-month period, accounting for
about one-third of persons who have
made this decision; White men (1 million retirees) accounted for another
one-fourth. However, the pace of
growth in the retirement population has been especially high among
Latina and Black women. There are
now 427,000 more Latina women and
315,000 more Black women who are
retired compared to before the pandemic, a rate of growth of 18.8 percent
and 12.3 percent, respectively.
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More Native-Born Latino
Workers, Fewer Foreign
Born
Latinos born in the United States tend
to fare better socioeconomically than
those born outside of this country. We
observe this when it comes to trends
in employment over the 16-month
period reviewed here, when nativeborn Latino men and Latina women
did much better than their immigrant
counterparts. While native-born
Latino men experienced a bump of 1
percent in persons having a job, there
were 4.6 percent fewer employed
foreign-born men. Among women,
the nativity gap was even wider with
4.3 percent fewer U.S.-born women
working compared to 8.3 percent
fewer foreign-born women (Figure
6). No other group examined here
has sustained such a great plunge in
employment as have Latina immigrant women, the closest being Black
women, who experienced a decline in
employment of 5.7 percent.
This nativity divide concerning the
job fortunes of Latinos reflects, in
part, the distinct population growth
rates of U.S.- and foreign-born
Latinos due to age structure and
immigration trends. The native-born
civilian labor force, which includes
the U.S.-born children of immigrants, is quite young, with a median
age of 32 in June 2021; the median
age of the foreign-born labor force is
44. In addition, over the last decade
immigration has slowed significantly,
particularly among those originating
from Mexico,2 and it came to a halt
during the pandemic. Thus, between
February 2020 and June 2021, the
native-born Latino civilian population 16 and older rose by 4.2 percent,
as these young Latinos reached
working age, while the foreign-born
Latino civilian population remained
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FIGURE 5. PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYED PERSONS BY RACE/ETHNICITY
AND GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.

FIGURE 6. PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYED LATINA/OS BY NATIVITY AND
GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.

virtually unchanged, with a 0.1
percent increase, as few newcomers arrived. These disparate growth
trends were already afoot prior to
the pandemic: between February

2018 and June 2019, the native-born
Latino civilian population 16 and
older increased by 5.0 percent, while
that of the foreign born dipped by
0.1 percent.
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Unemployment Still a
Reality for Workers of
Color

FIGURE 7. PERCENT OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE UNEMPLOYED BY RACE/
ETHNICITY AND GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021

Despite the favorable trend concerning more Black men and nativeborn Latino men working now than
prior to the pandemic, Black and
Latino men and women have higher
unemployment rates compared to
Whites (Figure 7). White women
(4.9 percent) and men (5.1 percent)
had the lowest unemployment rates
in June 2021, while Black men (10.3
percent), Black women (9.2 percent),
and Latina women (8.8 percent) had
the highest.

Higher Joblessness
Among U.S.-Born Latinos
Than Immigrants
Another seeming anomaly is that,
despite more favorable trends regarding employment among native-born
Latinos compared to their immigrant counterparts, Latina women
(9.7 percent) and Latino men (8.3
percent) born in the United States
have higher unemployment rates
than their immigrant counterparts
(Figure 8). Foreign-born Latino men
have the lowest jobless rate at 4.4
percent. These trends are consistent
with those we observed a year ago,
although at that time immigrant
women had higher unemployment
levels than U.S.-born women.

The College Diploma
Divide
There are clearly two worlds associated with how well U.S. workers
have fared in the pandemic. While
those with at least a bachelor’s
degree have generally been able
to keep their jobs, the situation is
much more precarious among those

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.

FIGURE 8. PERCENT OF LATINA/O CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE UNEMPLOYED
BY NATIVITY AND GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.

who do not have a college diploma.
This segment of the analysis focuses
on persons 25 and older, the group
that the U.S. Census Bureau uses in
the computation of overall educational attainment levels.

The number of persons without
a college diploma who had a job
dropped by 6.1 percent between
February 2020 and June 2021, a
decline that is more than twice as
high as that for individuals with a
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bachelor’s degree or higher (2.6 percent) (Figure 9). Notably, 6.4 million
fewer persons 25 and older had a job
in June 2021 than in February 2020.
Of these persons who no longer had
a job, three-fourths were persons who
are not college graduates, although
they made up only 58 percent of the
civilian labor force in February 2020.
Less-educated persons were also
more likely to exit the civilian labor
force than were their more-educated
counterparts (declining 3.5 percent
and increasing 1.0 percent, respectively) over the 16-month period. The
retirement option appears to be more
common among the more educated:
the number of retirees increased by
11 percent between February 2020
and June 2021 among this group,
nearly twice as high as the percent
increase among persons without a
college diploma (5.8 percent).
The unemployment rate of people
without a bachelor’s degree stood at
6.8 percent in June 2021, almost twice
as high as that of persons with a bachelor’s degree or higher (3.6 percent).
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FIGURE 9. PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYED PERSONS 25 AND OLDER BY
EDUCATION LEVEL, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.

FIGURE 10. PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYED PERSONS 25 AND OLDER BY
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, RACE/ETHNICITY, AND GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020 TO
JUNE 2021

The Worsening Job
Situation of Less-Educated
Women and Black Men
With a College Degree
However, among persons with lower
levels of education, it is women
across the board who have been particularly hard hit (Figure 10), with
upward of 9 percent fewer having a
job in June 2021 than in February
2020 (specifically, a decline of 9.9
percent for Black women, 9.4 percent
for White women, and 9 percent for
Latinas). Less-educated White men
(-6.1 percent) lag behind Black (+8.1
percent) and Latino (-2.4 percent)
men, with fewer having a job in
June 2021 than 16 months earlier.
Women (White, -6.8 percent; Latina,

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.

-5.7 percent; Black, -4.9 percent)
and White men (-4.6 percent) with
less education have also experienced
greater exit rates from the civilian labor force. On the other hand,
there were 11.8 percent more Black
men without a college diploma who
were part of the labor force in June

2021 than in February 2020. Lesseducated Latino men are also close to
breaking even, with 0.9 percent fewer
being in the labor force now than
prior to the pandemic.
Overall, persons with college
diplomas have fared much better, with Latino men (0.8 percent)
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and Latina women (0.3 percent)
experiencing increasing employment in June 2021 than 16 months
earlier. Latina women (4.5 percent)
and Latino men (3.0 percent) also
posted a rise in their participation
in the civilian labor force. Moreeducated Black men, however, represent the anomaly. One-fifth fewer
of them had a job in June 2021
compared to February 2020.

FIGURE 11. PERCENT OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE 25 AND OLDER UNEMPLOYED
BY EDUCATION LEVEL, RACE/ETHNICITY, AND GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020 TO
JUNE 2021

People of Color Continue
to Suffer From Higher Unemployment, Regardless
of Educational Level
Across educational levels and gender,
Whites had the lowest unemployment rates in June 2021. White men
and White women registered the lowest jobless rates, whether they had less
education (5.5 percent unemployment) or more (just over 3 percent)
(Figure 11). In fact, Black men and
Latina women with a college diploma
are more likely to be unemployed
than White men and women who do
not have a college degree. Among all
categories, Black men (11.3 percent),
Black women (10 percent), and
Latina women (8.3 percent) had the
highest rates of unemployment. For
Black men with less education, their
significant gains in the labor force
and jobs did not translate to lower
unemployment levels.

Varying Employment
Trends of Native- and
Foreign-Born Latinos
Employment change has varied
tremendously among Latinos once
we account for nativity status, educational level, and gender (Figure
12). The subgroups examined here
can be grouped into three categories
based on their employment trends

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.

FIGURE 12. PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYED LATINA/OS 25 AND OLDER BY
EDUCATION LEVEL, NATIVITY, AND GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.

over the course of the 16 months to
June 2021. The first category consists
of those who were working more in
June 2021 than in February 2020:
native-born Latino men (an increase
of 11.3 percent) and Latina women

(4.1 percent) with a college diploma.
The second category includes groups
with a slight decline in persons holding jobs between February 2020 and
June 2021: foreign-born (-1.9 percent) and native-born (-3.0 percent)
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Latino men with a college degree
are close to equalizing their percentages with a job 16 months earlier.
The third category consists of groups
that have fared the worst, with much
lower percentages of persons having
a job now than before the pandemic:
fewer foreign-born men with a college diploma (-12.8 percent), foreignborn (-9.7 percent) and native-born
women (-8.2 percent) without a
college diploma, and foreign-born
women with a college diploma (-6.4
percent) had a job in June 2021 than
in February 2020.
Four groups stand out with respect
to significant changes in the size of
the civilian labor force. Native-born
Latino men (14.4 percent) and Latina
women (8.4 percent) with college
degrees have experienced significant
increases in their participation in
the civilian labor force; foreign-born
Latino men with a college diploma
(-11.5 percent) and foreign-born
Latina women with lower levels of
education (-9.7 percent) have sustained major declines in the civilian
labor force.
The unemployment rates in June
2021 vary significantly as well.
College-educated Latino men (foreign born, 3 percent; native born,
3.5 percent) have the lowest levels of
unemployment (Figure 13). In contrast, native-born Latina women with
lower levels of education (9.7 percent)
and foreign-born Latina women with
a college degree (8.5 percent) have
the highest jobless rates.

Who Gets to Work From
Home?
In March 2020, in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic and following
shutdowns across the United States,
many employees moved to teleworking. At first seen as a temporary
measure, working from home soon
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FIGURE 13. PERCENT OF LATINA/O CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE 25 AND OLDER
UNEMPLOYED BY EDUCATION LEVEL, NATIVITY, AND GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020
TO JUNE 2021

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.

became a new normal for those
employed in occupations that did not
require personal contact and physical presence at the workplace. More
than one year since the onset of the
pandemic, a large segment of the
workforce is still engaged in remote
work. Despite all the challenges associated with shifting to working from
home (technological issues, blurred
boundaries between work and personal life, child care responsibilities,
and so forth), teleworking allowed
workers to keep their employment
and minimized health risks throughout the pandemic.
The wide inequalities in job loss
and recovery that have disproportionately hit the most disadvantaged
demographic groups are in part
associated with the ability to work
remotely.3 More-educated, highincome professionals engaged in
occupations that require greater
reliance on technology embraced the
opportunity of working from home,
while the rest of the labor force suffered from job losses or continued to

perform essential and frontline jobs
bearing high health risks. Racial/
ethnic and educational divisions in
teleworking echo the disparities in
unemployment rates and labor force
exits described above.
In this part of the analysis, we
compare the percent of employees working from home during
the May 2020–June 2021 period
across racial/ethnic, gender, and
educational-attainment categories.
Figure 14 demonstrates the overall
racial disparities in the opportunity
to work remotely. Throughout the
13 months, Whites were more likely
to work from home than Blacks
and Latinos. The gap between
Whites and Latinos is particularly
pronounced: around 15 percent of
White workers were still working
from home in June 2021 compared
to less than 10 percent of Latinos.
Gender comparisons across all
three racial/ethnic groups reveal
that women have been more likely
to telework during the pandemic
than men (Figure 15). We believe
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FIGURE 14. PERCENT OF U.S. EMPLOYEES WHO WORKED FROM HOME, BY
RACE/ETHNICITY, MAY 2020 TO JUNE 2021

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.

FIGURE 15. PERCENT OF U.S. WORKERS WHO WORKED FROM HOME BY RACE/
ETHNICITY AND GENDER, MAY 2020 TO JUNE 2021

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.

that in this case the gender gap
does not point to a more privileged
position of women in the labor
market (in terms of occupations
and skills), but rather reflects the
fact that women were forced to turn
to teleworking to fulfill child care
responsibilities. Yet again, across
genders, Whites have the advantage
over other racial/ethnic groups
in terms of being able to perform
their jobs from home, meaning that
despite these child care responsibilities many women of color and those
with lower levels of education were
unable to work from home.
Our findings, however, show that
the highest disparities in teleworking are associated with educational
differences (Figure 16). Workers
holding at least a bachelor’s degree
are the most privileged with
respect to teleworking: the percent of Whites with a bachelor’s
degree working from home was
as high as 60 percent in May 2020
and decreased to 30 percent in
May 2021; for Black and Latino
workers with a bachelor’s degree
the percent working remotely was
lower. The remote work patterns
for the least-educated group depict
a very different picture: the percent of remote workers across all
races and ethnicities in this group
never exceeded 10 percent. That
racial/ethnic gaps in working
remotely decrease once populations are stratified by education
suggests that overall racial/ethnic
differences are highly correlated
with differences in educational
attainment. Race and ethnicity
differences are only visible for the
highly educated group, reflecting
the proposition that education does
not translate into occupational
prestige and status at the same rate
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FIGURE 16. PERCENT OF U.S. WORKERS WHO WORKED FROM HOME BY
RACE/ETHNICITY AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, MAY 2020 TO JUNE 2021

Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.

for all racial/ethnic groups. That is,
that even highly-educated persons
of color are unable to work from
home points to smaller protective
effects of educational attainment
for persons of color. Racial/ethnic
differences in work-from-home
patterns can be better understood
in line with other empirical studies
in the field of racial disparities that
demonstrate the existence of racial/
ethnic gaps in wages, occupational
prestige, wealth, and health among
highly educated workers.4 Deeper
structural causes could be the contributing factors for the racial/ethnic disparities: job segregation due
to labor market discrimination,
residential segregation (by reducing the quality of education and
occupation), and vertical mismatch
between the individual’s educational level and education requirements for the occupation (highly
educated people of color are channeled into mismatched jobs).5

Conclusions and Policy
Implications
In our earlier analysis of the U.S. job
situation in the beginning stages of
the pandemic, we discovered that
women and persons of color were
disproportionately impacted by
tremendous levels of job loss, and
they lagged significantly behind
men and Whites, respectively, in
their level of job recovery. Our
updated analysis reveals that,
while the employment situation
has improved noticeably since the
economic abyss of the shutdown of
the economy in April 2020, we are
still a long way from job recovery.6
Further, as we observed about a year
ago, women and people of color
continue to be the furthest removed
from job recovery. We also showed
that unemployment rates need to
be considered alongside the major
declines in the number of persons
in the civilian labor force and those
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holding a job. Finally, demographic
groups who were able to work from
home—disproportionately White
and more-educated workers—have
fared much better than those who
did not have this safety net.
Our findings have important
policy implications for the short- and
long-term as, and after, the pandemic
recedes. Many people are still without
employment due to the loss of jobs
that have not yet returned, the obligations they have for child care and
elder care, and other situations. Many
are on the verge of losing their homes
as eviction bans expire. Many families
continue to face hunger.7 There is a
major need for the creation of policy
to ensure that people have their basic
necessities met and that they are
able to make necessary adjustments,
including job retraining, to begin the
process of rebuilding their lives in the
coming months and years. President
Biden’s infrastructure bills would be
particularly helpful in putting to work
many people who desperately need
jobs today. Franklin Roosevelt’s New
Deal represents a model for rebuilding and sustaining our country, our
workers, and our people.
Furthermore, as numerous industries face job shortages, it is important that policymakers craft policies
that support workers on the margins who for too long have endured
the lack of basic benefits including
sick leave, health insurance, decent
wages, parental leave, and affordable
child care. Given a major slowdown
in U.S. population growth brought
about by aging, alongside the reduction of fertility and immigration
aggravated by the pandemic, there
will be an increasing demand for
workers following the pandemic.
The competitiveness of businesses
will increasingly be tied to investing
in their workforces.
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Put simply, more than ever we will need creative
policies that prioritize the needs of all Americans
and especially those who have for too long been
relegated to the margins. There is a profound need
for bold solutions that change the status quo that
has recreated inequality and heightened risks for our
most vulnerable citizens.

Methodology
Monthly Current Population Survey microdata
are from the Integrated Public Microdata Series,
IPUMS–CPS.8 Data are subset to contain only those
respondents in the civilian labor force 16 years of
age and older. All estimates are weighted by the
WTFINL variable to be representative of the U.S.
labor force. No statistical testing was done; all estimates presented are population-weighted means, so
intergroup comparisons may not have statistical significance. A minimum sample size of 30 respondents
for each population subgroup, per month, was used
to avoid statistically unstable estimates. The race/
ethnicity variable created here is a combination of
both the self-reported race and Hispanic/Latino ethnicity of the respondent. Latino/a ethnicity includes
all respondents who reported Hispanic/Latino
ethnicity, regardless of race; Whites include nonHispanic White respondents; and Blacks include
non-Hispanic Black respondents. Unfortunately,
sample sizes were relatively small for other racial
groups. All data and code related to this brief are
available at Dr. Corey Sparks’s Github repository
github.com/corey_sparks/unemployment.
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